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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN KOREA

Kon Sik KIM *

The 1984 revision of Korea's Commercial Code failed to respond adequately to the issues of
structure and governance in large Korean corporations. The managements of such corporations are
able to circumvent both legal and market restraints on this conduct and thus act more freely than their
U.S. counterparts. If the Korean economy is to continue expanding the government must confront the
problem of management accountability or suffer stagnation as foreign and domestic investors seek
other markets.

1. Introduction
Large corporations play a central role in modern capitalist societies. Corporate influence extends beyond the economic arena to both political and
cultural affairs. Because of this influence, lawyers, economists, and business
leaders have carefully studied the structure and governance of business corporations. In the United States, debate on corporate governance among both
academics and practitioners [1] led the American Law Institute (ALI) to
propose an ambitious first draft of Principles of Corporate Governance [2].
Criticism of the draft was extensive when it came out in 1982 [3]. In the more
recent drafts [4], the ALI qualified its original position on many points.
The recent revision of Korea's Commercial Code [5], which became effective on September 1, 1984, provides an opportunity to compare corporate
governance in Korea with corporate management in the United States. Corporate governance has not been discussed as extensively in Korea as it has in the
United States. The 1984 revision is the first statutory change since the
Commercial Code was enacted in 1962.
During the past two decades, Korea's economy has expanded rapidly and
business corporations have played a decisive role in Korea's economic development [6]. Although the 1984 revision covers more than 150 provisions, it
barely addresses the issue of corporate structure and governance. This apparent neglect of corporate governance should not suggest a resolution of
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corporate governance issues in Korea. Rather, corporate governance eventually will provoke widespread controversy in Korea.
This paper examines the statutory framework of corporate structure and
governance in Korea. Providing a background for subsequent discussions,
section 2 shows how the shareholding pattern of large corporations in Korea
differs from the U.S. pattern. It then briefly discusses the significance of such
differences. Section 3 examines how the various statutory mechanisms in
Korea are designed to control management behavior and the reasons they fail
to work. Finally, section 4 deals with market mechanisms restraining management conduct in Korea.

2. Ownership and Control of Large Corporations in Korea: Its Reality and
Significance
The Korean Commercial Code permits four types of business organizations: (1) the partnership company, an entity whose members assume
unlimited liability for the company's obligations; (2) the limited partnership
company, an entity composed of two classes of members, those who assume
unlimited liability for the company's obligations, and those who do not
assume liability beyond the value of their shares; (3) the private limited
liability company, an entity similar to a closed corporate enterprise; and (4)
the stock company, the equivalent of the publicly held business corporation in
the United States.
Korean companies clearly favor the corporate form. Even joint venture
corporations, which could operate more efficiently as private limited liability
companies, prefer this type of organization [7]. As in Japan, the overwhelming
popularity of the corporate form probably results from the "first class" image
that such companies project [8].
Most Korean corporations are relatively small [9]. Although a closely held
corporation is not necessarily small by definition [10], virtually all corporations below the one billion won line are closely held [11]. Moreover, many of
the large corporations above the one billion won line are probably closely held
[12]. In addition, available data indicate that the shareholdings in corporations
listed on the Korean Stock Exchange are not widely distributed among the
public, but heavily concentrated in a small number of people.
The number of corporations listed on the Korean Stock Exchange increased
from 66 in 1972 to 334 in 1982 [14]. Table 1 indicates that the government goal
of wider distribution of equities among the public has been achieved to a
marked degree in the period 1972-1982 [15]. Concentration of shareholdings
nevertheless remains. Table 1 indicates that only 5,011 shareholders of 334
listed corporations hold as much as 54.83% of the total shares. This sharply
contrasts with the situation in the United States [16].
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Table I
Distribution of equity ownership by shareholding [13]
End of 1972
Below 100 shares
Persons
Shares
100-1.000 shares
Persons
Shares
1.000-10,000 shares
Persons
Shares
10,000-100,000 shares
Persons
Shares
Over 100,000 shares
Persons
Shares
Total
Persons
Shares

End of 1982

76,096 (73.69%)
1,229,206 (0.58%)

158.875 (23.29%)
5.947.890 (0.13%)

18,526 (17.94%)
5.953.606 (2.79%)

276.641 (40.55%)
115,365,896 (2.43%)

6.823
20,160,664

(6.60%)
(9.43%)

191,367 (280.05%)
649,246.801 (13.65%)

1,610 (1.55%)
40.545,600 (18.97%)

50.281 (0.73%)
1,376,152,300 (28.96%)

211 (0.20%)
145.902.380 (68.25%)

5.022 (0.73%)
2,606,577,365 (54.83%)

103.266 (100.00%)
214,791,456 (100.00%)

682.175 (100.00%)
4,753.290,252 (100.00%)

The actual extent of concentration of shareholdings in Korea, however, may
be much greater than table 1 suggests. Most business corporations in Korea
are owned by single families [17]. They are reluctant to go public and thus
endanger their control over the corporations they themselves have founded
[18]. For financing, even the largest corporations heavily rely on domestic or
foreign banks, or on private money markets rather than the securities market
[19].
The government has pressured corporations to go public to improve the
highly leveraged corporate financial structure and to achieve wider distribution among the public of shares in major business institutions. The government has provided various incentives, including favorable tax treatment for
publicly held corporations [20]. Moreover, the government has simply ordered
selected corporations to go public [21]. In response, a number of leading
corporations have either refused to go public or have disguised themselves as
public by placing a substantial portion of shares under the names of "close
friends, relatives, employees, and occasionally, controlling shareholders of
other corporations in a reciprocal arrangement" [22].
Another phenomenon strengthening the actual degree of concentration of
equity ownership in Korea is the widespread practice of cross or circular
shareholdings among corporations in the same business group. One of the
most notable byproducts of rapid economic growth in Korea is the emergence
of several giant business conglomerates [23]. At present, most of the largest
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business corporations in Korea belong to one of these conglomerates. The
extensive use of the cross or circular ownership device has contributed to the
rapid expansion of these conglomerates. Through this device, controlling
persons have been able to expand their holdings without necessarily relinquishing ultimate control. Public concern has finally caused lawmakers to
prohibit a subsidiary from acquiring the stock of its parent [24].
These factors suggest the existence of a single controlling family even in
large corporations. The head of this family actively manages corporate affairs
or at least closely supervises the performance of management. Typically. the
entrepreneur who has founded the business group is the source of all power in
the group [25].
Thus, one may make a rough distinction among large corporations in Korea
and the United States. In large U.S. corporations, ownership and control are
separate; management, rather than shareholders, has control over corporate
affairs. In contrast, both ownership and control of Korean corporations are in
the hands of strong-willed founders. Although these entrepreneurs usually
assume the role of chief executives in the corporations, their ultimate power
derives not only from their status as top executive officers, but also from their
status as controlling shareholders.
2.2. Significance of the Existence of Owner-managers
The previous subsection concludes that in a typical large corporation in
Korea, a single family controls a substantial block of shares and the head of
the family is actively engaged in management of the member companies in his
business group. Thus, the interests of shareholders and management overlap
substantially. Consequently, agency problems are much less acute in Korea
than in the United States [26]. Indeed, owner-managers' relentless pursuit of
their own interests has contributed to the remarkable growth of the Korean
business corporation. Given the current integration of ownership and control,
corporate governance seems less important an issue in Korea than in the
United States. Without significant agency problems, the most important
function of corporate law is the protection of minority rights against the
misconduct of controlling shareholders.
It is difficult to predict how this concentrated shareholding pattern of
Korean corporations will change. Yet, due to current government policy as
well as economic forces, it is clear that the percentage of controlling shareholders' holdings will eventually decline with the passage of time. In order to
distribute shares more evenly among the public, the government encourages
corporations to rely on eqiity financing instead of debt financing [27]. The
government also discourages banks from further lending to their large corporate borrowers [28]. Because debt financing has lost much of its appeal [29],
the inflation rates of the recent years have been low [30]. Moreover, as long as
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both government policy and the securities laws continue to discourage hostile
takeovers and challenges to existing control [31], controlling shareholders may
substantially reduce their holdings without risking ultimate control. As the
percentage of controlling shareholders' equity interest decreases, however.
their interest and that of the corporation may diverge, causing agency problems to develop.
Because government policy and economic forces may take a long time to
affect corporate structure, Korea should develop effective statutory mechanisms to control management behavior. However, the statutory scheme must
not unduly encumber management's efforts to maximize corporate profits and
shareholder gain since these goals are central to the corporation [32].

3. Statutory Mechanisms for Checking Management
The Korean Commercial Code provides that "the business of the company
... shall be executed by the resolution of the board of directors" [33]. In the
United States it is generally recognized that management, headed by the chief
executive officer, rather than the board, operates the business [34]. In Korea,
the "representative director," the functional equivalent of the chairman of the
board in the United States, is the supreme authority in the actual operation of
the corporate business. Representative directors have authority to perform all
acts relating to the corporate business on behalf of the corporation [35].
In Korea, three organizational units are responsible for examining management conduct: (1) the board of directors; (2) "inside auditors": and (3)
shareholders. Contrary to the statutory purpose, however, none of these checks
can effectively curtail management's power vis-h-vis the minority shareholders.
3.1. The Board of Directors
The Code requires a corporation to have at least three directors who are
elected at shareholder meetings [36]. Since cumulative voting is unavailable
[37], a controlling shareholder may fill all the board positions with his
supporters.
Under the Code, the board, or the shareholders, if so provided in the
articles of iicorporation, has the power to appoint representative directors
[38]. Although the original Code had no provision for the board's power to
supervise and to remove representative directors, commentators did not dispute the board's supervisory role [39]. The 1984 amendments confirm this view
by providing that the board shall supervise the execution of corporate affairs
by its directors [40].
In the United States, as it became clear that the board of a large publicly
held corporation does not, and, is not, in a position to actually "manage" the
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corporate business, the oversight function of the board has moved into the
limelight [41]. Nevertheless, there has been wide criticism that, in actuality, the
board fails to perform that role [42]. Although the situation in Korea is
similar, it is more pronounced. In fact, the oversight function of the board is
virtually absent for several practical reasons.
First, the subordination of directors to the representative director renders
meaningful supervision impossible. Although similar criticism has been directed at U.S. corporations [43], the degree of such subordination is much
stronger in Korea, since in most cases the controlling shareholder himself or
his "right-hand man" serves as representative director. While the board selects
the representative director as a legal matter [44], the representative director (or
controlling shareholder behind him) selects the board members as a practical
matter. The controlling shareholder usually selects directors from among his
long-time employees. The loyalty of the candidate to the controlling shareholder is the crucial factor in the selection process. Removable at any time
with or without cause at a shareholders meeting [45], a director serves at the
pleasure of the controlling shareholder. Consequently, to expect a director to
risk his position by defying this shareholder is quite unrealistic.
A second factor that renders board supervision of management ineffective
is the near absence of outside directors on the board [46]. Even in large
corporations, most directors serve as officers or employees of the corporation
they "direct."
A recent survey shows that 92 out of 197 listed corporations have no
outside directors on their boards [47]. Thus, under the circumstances, the
board may well be compared to a batter who "calls his own strikes." The
supervisory function of the board thus remains- an illusion.
The 1984 amendments merely confirm the board's oversight function,
without introducing significant changes. Some Korean commentators have
recommended that a majority of the board members should be selected from
outside the company [48], but these recommendations have not appealed to
the corporate community [49]. Such a response is not surprising, considering
that Korean entrepreneurs have been reluctant to allow outsiders to participate in their businesses, even as shareholders.
3.2. Auditors
3.2.1. Inside Auditors
The presence of inside auditors in Korean corporations may justify the
exclusion of outside directors on the board. Indeed, the 1984 amendments to
the KCC focus on strengthening the power of inside auditors.
Under the Code, a 9tock corporation must have at least one inside auditor,
who may not serve concurrently as a director, a manager, or as any other
employee of the corporation [50]. Inside auditors are selected at shareholder
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meetings [51]. In selecting inside auditors, any shareholder with more than
three percent of the total outstanding voting shares may not vote the excess
shares [52]. The recent revision extends the term of office for inside auditors
from one to two years [53].
Prior to the revision, the responsibilities of inside auditors were generally
limited to accounting matters [54]. The amended Code expands the role of
inside auditors to cover operational as well as accounting matters by providing
that "the inside auditor shall examine the directors' performance" [55]. In
addition, inside auditors are jointly and severally liable to the corporation for
damages caused by their failure to perform their duties [56]. Such a failure
may give rise to a derivative suit [57].
Although the 1984 revision theoretically strengthens the role of the inside
auditor, in practice he or she will merely act as a "rubber stamp." This
discrepancy between theory and practice exists because the amendments have
failed to ensure the independence of the inside auditor.
The Code prohibits the inside auditor from serving concurrently as a
director, a manager, or any other employee of the corporation [58]. but the
Code requires no more. As long as he or she is not presently maintaining any
of those positions, any person may serve as inside auditor, however obvious
and strong his or her ties are to management. One may argue that prohibiting
a shareholder with more than three percent of the total outstanding voting
shares from voting the excess shares may diminish substantially the influence
of the controlling shareholder on the election of inside auditors [59]. The three
percent maximum provision, however, may be avoided by secretly distributing
the excess shares among relatives or friends [60]. Combined with the inertia
and disorganization of small shareholders, this procedural approach is unlikely
to enhance the neutrality of inside auditors.
3.2.2. Outside Auditors
The external audit, required under other statutes, may remedy the deficiency of the internal audit system under the Commercial Code. The most
important audit is the external audit required by the Law Concerning the
External Audit of Stock Corporations (External Audit Law) [61]. Pursuant to
the External Audit Law, a corporation with both capital and total assets in
excess of 500 million won and 3 billion won, respectively, must have its
financial statements audited by an outside auditor [62]. The outside auditor,
who must be either a certified public accountant or an accounting firm, has
the following duties: (1) to audit the financial statements and submit an audit
report to the corporation and the Audit Supervision Committee attached to
the Securities Supervisory Board [63]; (2) to report any improper acts
committed by a director in performing his duties and any material violations
of law or the articles of incorporation [641; and (3) to attend shareholder
meetings upon request of the shareholders and present opinion or answer
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questions [65]. Outside auditors may be liable to the corporation or third
parties for failure to perform their duties, and may be subject to disciplinary
measures for violation of the Law [66].
Nonetheless, Korean law provides that "corporations" must appoint the
outside auditor [67]. The power to appoint an outside auditor will, therefore,
rest in most cases with the board of directors or, as a practical matter, the
representative director [68]. Accordingly, the independence and objectivity of
an external audit is clearly questionable.
3.3. Shareholders
3.3.1. GeneralMeeting: Law and Reality
A general meeting of shareholders must be held once a year, but if the
corporation has more than one fiscal period a year a meeting must be held
once during each period [69]. Usually, the board of directors determines
whether to convene a general meeting [70], but shareholders with five percent
or more of the total outstanding shares may force the board to call an
extraordinary meeting of shareholders [71].
The power of shareholders at the general meeting is limited to the matters
provided for in the Code or the articles of incorporation [72]. Ordinarily,
matters handled at that meeting include: (1) approval of the balance sheet, the
income statement, and the profit or loss disposal statement [73]; and (2)
election of directors and inside auditors [74].
Except as otherwise provided in the Code or the articles of incorporation,
shareholders representing a majority of the total outstanding shares constitute
a quorum, and a majority vote of the shares represented at the meeting is
required to pass ordinary resolutions [75]. A two-thirds majority is necessary
for matters such as: (1) amendment of the articles of incorporation [76]; (2)
transfer of all or a substantial part of the business [77]; (3) removal of
directors and inside auditors [78]; and (4) merger, consolidation, or dissolution [79].
Similar to their U.S. counterparts, small shareholders in Korea have little
interest in attending shareholder meetings. Most of them are speculators rather
than investors [80]. If small shareholders do attend meetings, their impact is
minimal because a majority of the shares are in the hands of a few controlling
shareholders. Consequently. despite the legal illusion of management accountability to shareholders, the reality is that management is accountable only to
the largest shareholders. Under such a governance structure shareholder
meetings will inevitably serve merely to validate the acts and proposals of
management.
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3.3.. Shareholders' Rights Vis-b-vis Directors
3.3.2.1. Shareholders' rights in removing directors. Shareholders may remove
directors at any time, with or without cause, by passing a special resolution at
a shareholder meeting [81]. If, despite the director's material misconduct, the
resolution fails to pass, then shareholders with five percent or more of the
outstanding shares may resort to the courts for judicial removal of the director
[82]. The shareholders may apply for a temporary order to deprive the director
of his authority and to appoint an acting director [83]. The availability of such
a procedure thus provides shareholders with a limited remedy for director
mismanagement. The five percent requirement, nonetheless. poses an enormous obstacle to shareholder use of this device in the large publicly held
corporation.
3.3.2.2. Inspection rights. A shareholder may inspect or copy financial statements and audit reports kept at the main office [84]. To gain access to
accounting books and records, however, shareholders are required to have at
least five percent of the total outstanding shares [851. Normally, directors must
prove the unreasonableness of the shareholders' demand for such inspection in
order to avoid it [86], but in publicly held corporations the shareholders carry
the burden of proving that their demand is reasonable [871. Thus, shareholder
access to financial information remains limited.
If any doubt arises as to the existence of grave misconduct on the part of
directors, shareholders with five percent of the total shares may demand that
the court appoint an inspector authorized to investigate corporate affairs and
financial status [88]. Nevertheless, because of this five percent shareholding
requirement, small shareholders' ability to gauge management performance is
effectively minimized.
3.3.2.3. Fiduciaryduties. Korea has no provision expressly stating the fiduciary
duties of management [891. Since the mandate provisions of the Civil Code
[90] are applicable to the relationship between the corporation and directors
[91], the latter have the duty of care of a good manager [92], which is
functionally equivalent to the fiduciary duty imposed on the director of a U.S.
corporation. Moreover, the Commercial Code provides three sets of regulations to prevent directors from breaching their duty as good managers [93].
First, a director who seeks to execute any transaction with the corporation
on his own behalf or on behalf of a third person must obtain the board's
approval [94]. Although the Code does not expressly provide so. it is generally
agreed that such a requirement is limited to those transactions that may cause
a conflict of interest between the director and the corporation [95].
Second, a director who intends to effect a transaction that falls within the
same line of business as carried on by the corporation must obtain approval of
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the shareholders [96]. If the director acts on his own behalf, then the corporation may treat the transaction as though it were effected on behalf of the
corporation [97]. If he acts on behalf of a third person, then the corporation
still may demand any benefit resulting from the transaction [98]. The avaricious director may be liable to the corporation for any damage caused by his
conduct and may be removed [99].
The scope of this principle, which purports to prohibit competition with the
corporation, is quite limited compared with that of the "corporate opportunity" doctrine in the United States. While the U.S. doctrine precludes corporate
fiduciaries from usurping corporate opportunities - "opportunities in which
the corporation has a right, property interest, or expectancy, or which in
justice should belong to the corporation" [100] - the Korean counterpart
adheres to the concept of "line of business," which is only one of a variety of
standards traditionally employed by U.S. courts in determining whether an
opportunity constitutes a "corporate opportunity" [101].
Third. the amount of director compensation must be determined by a
resolution of the shareholders, unless the articles of incorporation provide
otherwise [102]. Although not expressly supported by the language of the
Code, a shareholders meeting generally sets only the total amount of compensation available to all the directors, while the board apportions a salary to
each director [103]. If compensation is not fixed either in the articles of
incorporation or by resolution, a court may determine a "reasonable amount"
based on relevant facts [104].
While these laws do indeed provide for limited management accountability
to shareholders, limited access to corporate records [105] and majority shareholders that are probably the least interested in curbing directors' indiscretions
[106], ensure that such laws will be ineffective in enforcing fiduciary duties.
3.3.2.4. Derivative suits. The Code provides for other mechanisms to enforce
the directors' responsibilities as well. The shareholders' derivative suit is the
most important of these mechanisms. Shareholders holding five percent of the
corporation's outstanding shares may demand that the corporation bring suit
to hold directors liable for failing to perform their duties [107]. If the
corporation fails to bring suit within thirty days after the demand, then the
shareholders may file a derivative suit against the directors [108]. A shareholder holding more than five percent of the outstanding stock may also file a
derivative suit to enjoin a director who engages in an ultra vires or other illegal
act that might cause irreparable harm to the corporation [109].
The derivative suit provisions, however, have been totally ignored in Korea.
During the two decades since its adoption, no reported derivative suit exists
[110]. This peculiar phenomenon has been attributed to various factors. First,
the Commercial Code requires dissenting shareholders to have at least five
percent of the corporation's outstanding stock in order to file a derivative suit
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[1111. This five percent requirement poses an enormous obstacle to a shareholder of a large publicly held corporation [112].
Second, a Korean court has limited discretion to determine whether or not
a director breached his or her fiduciary duties. The legality of a director's
conduct depends on a relatively simple decision as to whether he or she
obtained approval by shareholders or the board rather than on an objective
determination as to whether or not that conduct was "fair or reasonable"
[1131.
Third, shareholders are not generally in a position to collect enough
information to win a derivative suit. Disclosure requirements under Korea's
securities law are inadequate [114]. More importantly, no discovery system
comparable to that in the United States is available in Korea [115].
Finally, a shareholder in Korea has a much weaker economic incentive to
bring a derivative suit than his U.S. counterpart. As in the United States.
successful shareholders in Korea are entitled to reimbursement by the corporation for a "reasonable amount" of attorney fees incurred in litigating the suit
[1161. But the "reasonable amount" must be within the scope of actual fees
[1171. In determining the "reasonable amount," Korean courts are reluctant to
award damages beyond the "going rate" [1181.
While the shareholder derivative suit is a common method of overseeing
corporate action in the United States, the five percent shareholding requirement, the lack of discovery, limited judicial discretion, and weak incentives
severely limit the derivative suit as an effective mechanism for enforcing
corporate directors' responsibility in Korea.

4. Absence of Market Imposed Checks on Management
Three types of market mechanism restrain corporate management: the
product market; the financial market; and the market for corporate control
[119]. It is unlikely, however, that market pressures in Korea influence
manages of large corporations to significantly modify their behavior. Several
factors contribute to the minimized impact of market mechanisms on corporate managers in Korea. Many large Korean corporations, for example.
dominate their own product markets [120]. The government tightly controls
Korea's financial market and business performance has been much less
important a factor in bank loan decisions than in the United States [1211. The
market for corporate control, regarded as the most important of all the market
mechanisms, does not exist in Korea.Practical reasons prevent hostile takeovers in Korea. Because shares are
heavily concentrated in the hands of a small number of controlling shareholders, gaining a majority or controlling block of shares through a tender
offer is impossible as a practical matter. Indeed, a major reason for Korean
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entrepreneurs' opposition to public offerings of their stock has been their fear
of losing control. To dispel this fear, the government has provided some
statutory safeguards for incumbent management.
Under the Securities and Exchange Law, a shareholder in a corporation
listed on the Korean Stock Exchange may not hold shares in excess of the
percentage he or she initially held at the time of listing [122]. Subject to a fine,
a shareholder violating this prohibition may not vote the excess shares and
may have to dispose of them [123]. Some exceptions to this prohibition exist,
however. For example, one may acquire shares through a tender offer solicitation or a direct purchase from a shareholder holding more than ten percent
[124].
These restrictions are much more effective in discouraging shifts in corporate control than the reporting requirement under U.S law [125]. While
Korean law flatly prohibits ownership increase beyond the ten percent maximum limit [126], U.S. law merely requires a party acquiring five percent or
more of a certain security to report such acquisition and his intentions with
respect to the issuer of such security [127]. Given the concentration of
shareholdings in a few controlling shareholders in Korea, this ten percent limit
imposes an insurmountable obstacle to corporate raiders.
In addition, Korean statutes governing tender offers generally are favourable to the management of the target corporation rather than the tender offeror
[128]. As a defensive tactic, the target corporation may campaign to persuade
its shareholders not to sell their shares to the offeror [129]. In communicating
with its shareholders, the target corporation may not omit a material fact or
state a misleading fact [130]. Even if the target company's recommendation is
misleading, however, remedies such as amendment orders or stop orders are
not available under the present securities statutes. Moreover, unlike U.S. law
[131], Korean law does not explicitly require the target corporation to submit
information that would aid a shareholder in evaluating the management's
recommendation [132]. The Korean securities laws thus remove the most
effective curb on corporate management that a minority shareholder possesses
- the threat of hostile takeover.
5. Conclusion
The Korean corporation differs from the U.S. corporation in that ownership and control merge, often in one family or individual. The Korean
Commercial Code has attempted to address this problem by providing means
for checking management behavior. Unfortunately, the Code is ineffective;
rather than changing the existing system, the Code perpetuates the system by
requiring checking mechanisms that management can easily manipulate to
serve its own ends. Market mechanisms are also unable to restrain corporate
management.
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33

The failure of the Code and the market to control corporate managers has
not left them completely unrestrained. The government has influenced major
financial institutions in their decisions whether or not to grant loans to a
particular company [133]. In this manner the government may discipline
managers for their poor performance.
To rely on government to discipline managers, however, is undesirable
because of the arbitrariness and possibility of corruption. Consequently.
Korea presently lacks an effective method for restraining corporate managers
and must search for other mechanisms that effectively increase management
accountability to minority shareholders.
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(statistics section).
[14] Korea Stock Exchange, Chusik (July, 1984), at 8 (statistics section).
[15] Because most Korean corporations were highly leveraged, they could not raise the capital
needed for rapid economic growth. Government policy, therefore, sought to ameliorate the capital
structure by promoting the securities market. Y. Shin, Securities Regulations in Korea 45-50,
100-11 (1983).
[16] See Voting Rights in Major Corporations:Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1981), cited in E.
Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power 102 (1981).
[17] See Y. Shin, supra note 15, at 100.
[18] See id. at 42.
[19] Id. at 44.
[20] See Kiopkonggae Chokchinbop (Act Encouraging Public Offering by Enterprises) Law No.
2420 of 1972; Chabonsifang Yuksong e Kwanhan Ponuyul (Capital Market Promotion Act) Law
No. 2046 of 1968; Popinsebop (Corporation Tax Act) Law No. 1964 of 1967; Y. Shin, supra note
15, at 45-49, 64-68.
[21] Act Encouraging Public Offering by Enterprises, art. 4; see Y. Shin, supra note 15. at
64-66.
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[221 Y. Shin. supra note 15. at 162. Article 189 of Korea's Securities and Exchange Law
prohibits listed corporations from holding the shares of other listed corporations in such a
reciprocal arrangement. Chunggwvon Koraehop (Securities and Exchange Law) Law No. 972 of
1962. amended by Law No. 3541 of 1982.
[231 See L Jones & I. Sakong. supra note 6. at 258-69.
[241 Commercial Code, art. 342.
1251 See L. Jones & I. Sakong, supra note 6,at 258-60.
1261 Agency problems arise when decision-making agents (management) "do not bear a
substantial share of the wealth effects of their decision." Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership
and Control. 26 J. L. & Econ. 301 (1983): see also Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firn:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
[27] Much to Crow About, Business Korea. Nov. 1983, at 59-60. Government encouragement
includes such policies as permitting corporations to issue shares at market value, rather than par
value, and giving corporations flexibility in deciding dividend rates thereby increasing the
attractiveness of stock investment. Id.
128] See Big Business Concentration Put Under a New Critical Light. Business Korea. July
1984. at 51. 54-55 (government has tried to limit bank loans to one borrower to 25% of a bank's
net worth): Dong-A Ilbo. Aug. 27, 1984, at I Id.. Aug. 22, 1984, at 2.
[291 Since financial institutions' lending rates have been kept below the market rates, those
able to obtain institutional credits (in most cases, large corporations) have been subsidized
primarily by those depositors who pay inflation taxes. Thus, it is less likely that rational savers
would borrow to obtain financial assets and then have to pay inflation taxes. Most, therefore.
choose not to hold financial assets. D. Cole & Y. Park. Financial Development in Korea.
1945-1978. at 189-93 (1983).
1301 In 1983. wholesale prices rose by only 0.2% and consumer prices by just 3.4%. This trend
of price stability is expected to continue in 1984. High Growlt,. Low Inflation Seen to Continue
Through '85, Business Korea, June 1984. at 38. 39.
131] See Y. Shin. supra note 15. at 286-358.
[321 See ALl Draft No. 2. supra note 4, § 2.01.
[33] Commercial Code, art. 393.
[34] M. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation 139-41 (1976). Thus, a number of
modem corporate statutes in the United States provide that the business of a corporation shall be
managed by "or under the direction or' a board. See, e.g.. Del. Code Ann., tit. 8. § 141(a) (1983):
Cal. Corp. Code. § 300 (West Supp. 1983): Model Bus. Corp. Act, § 35 (1982). ALl Draft No. 2, §
3.01 suggests that corporate law provide that the management of the business of a publicly held
corporation shall be conducted by or under the supervision of certain senior executives who are
designated by the board of directors.
[351 Commercial Code. arts. 209, 389(3).
[361 Id. art. 382(1).
[37] Unlike several U.S. state laws, Korea's Commercial Code does not provide for cumulative
voting. See. e.g.. Del. Code. Ann.. tit. 8. § 214 (1983): Model Bus. Corp. Act, §33 (1982).
[38] Commercial Code, art. 389(1). The board may appoint more than one representative
director. See id. art. 389(2).
[39] H. Chong. I Sangbophak Wollon (Principles of Commercial Law) 425, 428 (1980).
[401 Commercial Code, art. 393(2).
[41] See, e.g., M. Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 157-70, American Bar Association. Corporate
Director'sGuidebook, 33 Bus. Law. 1591, 1621 (1978); ALl Draft No. 2. supra note 4, § 3.02.
[42] See, e.g.. M. Mace. Directors: Myth and Reality (1971): Mace, Directors: Myth and
Reality - Ten Years Later, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 293 (1979).
[43] See M. Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 144-48.
[441 Commercial Code, art. 389(1).
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[45] Such removal requires a two-thirds majority vote of the shares represented at a meeting
where a majority of the total outstanding shares are represented. A director removed without
cause from his office before the expiration of his term of office is entitled to compensation for any
damage caused by such removal. Id. art. 385(1).
[46] For purposes of this article, an independent director is one who does not hold an
executive position in the corporation in which he or she serves. According to this definition,
outside directors are not necessarily "independent" of management control.
[471 Kim Sangianghoesa isahoe iva sangmuhoe ui siltaebunsok (An Empirical Study of the
Board and Executive Committee in Listed Corporations) in K. Kim, Hoesabop i Chenmuie
(Issues in Corporation Law) 296, 303 (1982).
[48] Id. at 310-12.
[49] Neither the recommendations drafted by the Federation of Korean Industries nor those
drafted by the Korean Chamber of Commerce has mentioned the term "outside director."
Han'guk Snagsabop Hakhoe (Korean Commercial Law Society), Sangbop Kaejong Ui Noidom
(Issues in Revising the Commercial Code) 261-62. 276-77 (1981).
[50] Commercial Code, art. 411.
[51] Id. art. 409(1).
[52] Id. art. 409(7).
[53] More accurately, the term of office of inside auditors extends to the close of the ordinary
shareholders' meeting dealing with the last settlement of accounting within two years after taking
office. Id. art. 410.
[541 Sangbop (Commercial Code) Law No. 1000 of 1962, reprintedin Korean Legal Center, 3
Laws of the Republic of Korea § 8 (4th ed. 1983).
[55] 1984 Commercial Code, art. 412(1). The amendments further provide for the following
new responsibilities of the inside auditor:
(1) to call on the directors at any time for a report on the business and to
investigate corporate affairs such as financial status, id. art. 412(2):
(2) to attend board meetings and present his opinion, id. art. 391-2(l);
(3) to review directors' proposals and documents submitted at shareholder meetings
and to determine whether such proposals/documents comply with the law and
articles of incorporation, id. art. 413;
(4) to report to the board of directors if he finds that a director has violated the law
or articles of incorporation, id. art. 391-2(2);
(5) to enjoin a director from violating the law or articles of incorporation if such a
violation would irreparably harm the corporation, id. art. 402;
(6) to represent the corporation in a suit between the directors and the corporation,
id. art 394;
(7) to submit an audit report covering specified matters to directors, Id. art. 447-4.
[561 Id. art. 414(1). If an auditor's failure to perform his duties as an inside auditor is due to
bad faith or gross negligence, he or she may be liable to a third party. Id. art. 414(2).
[57] Id. arts. 403-06, 415.
[58] Id. art. 411.
[591 Id. art. 409(2).
[60] See Lee, Kanpasachedo ui chemunje (Problems of the Auditor System). in Hoesabop i
Hyondaejok Kwaje (Modern Issues in Corporation Law) 172, 186 (1981).
[611 Chusik Hoesa ui Oebu Kamsa e Kwanhan Pornnyul (External Audit Law) Law No. 3297 of
1980.
[62] Id. art. 2. In addition, a corporation that is listed on the stock exchange or raises funds
from the public may be subject to an outside audit. Securities and Exchange Law, art. 182.
[63] External Audit Law, art. 8. The Securities Supervisory Board is the executive body of the
Securities Administration Commission, the Korean equivalent of the Securities and Exchange
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Commission in the United States. See generally, Y. Shin, supra note 15, 96-98 (describing the
establishment of an institution similar to the SEC in Korea).
[64] External Audit Law, art. 10.
[65] Id. art. 11.
[661 Id. arts. 16-17.
[671 Id. art. 4.
[68] The Commercial Code powers vested in the shareholders are limited to those enumerated
in the Code and articles of incorporation. These powers include the right to appoint only internal
auditors at shareholder meetings. See Commercial Code, art. 361.
[691 Id. arts. 365(l), (2). Extraordinary meetings may be held from time to time as necessary.
Id. art. 365(3).
[701 Id. art. 362.
[711 Id. art. 366.
[72] Id. art. 361.
[731 Id. art. 449.
[741 Id. arts. 382(1). 409(1).
[751 Id. art. 368(l).
[76] Id. art. 434.
[77] Id. art. 374.
1781 Id. arts. 385(1), 415.
[79] Id. arts. 518. 522.
[80] A 1983 survey shows that 57.7% of 300 investors surveyed have transferred stock in less
than three months while only 6.9% of these investors have held stock for more than six months.
While as many as 30.1% short-term investors are mainly interested in a quick profit from a stock
price rise, less than 3% of them are dividend-seeking investors. Joong-Ang Ilbo. Jan. 31, 1984, at.
4.
[81] Commercial Code, art. 385(1). A director removed without cause before the expiration of
his term of office is entitled to compensation for any damage caused by the removal. Id.
[821 Id. art. 385(2).
[831 Id. art. 407.
[841 Id. art. 448(2).
[851 Id. art. 466(1).
[861 Id. art. 466(2).
[871 Capital Market Promotion Act, art. 11-5.
[881 Commercial Code, art. 467(1).
[891 But see Model Bus. Corp. Act §35 (1982).
[90] Mnbop (Civil Code) Law No. 471 of 1958. arts. 680-92.
[911 Commercial Code, art. 382(2).
[921 Civil Code, art. 681.
[93] Commercial Code, art. 398.
[941 Id. art. 382(2).
[951 See. e.g., Kang Tae-yong v. Hanjin Sikpum Kong'op Chusik Hoesa, 73 Ta 955 (Sup. Ct.
Jan. 15. 1984) (court applied KCC. art. 398 to such a transaction); Ha Tong-Ho v. Hanil Yogaek
Chadongch'a Chusik Hoesa. 80 Ta 828 (Sup. Ct. July 22. 1980) (held transaction without board
approval null and void).
[96] Commercial Code, art. 397(1). This approval requirement also applies to a director
seeking to become a director of another corporation in the same line of business as the first
corporation. Id.
1971 Id. art. 397(2).
198] Id.
199] Chong, supra note 39, at 434.
[1001 H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 10, at 632.
[1011 See id. at 633-34; Brudney & Clark. A New Look at CorporateOpportunities, 94 Harv.
L Rev. 997, 1006-22 (1981).
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[102] Commercial Code, art. 388.
[103] T. Lee, PallyeKyojae Hoesabop (Casebook on Corporation Law) 433 (2nd ed. 1982).
[104] Kim, I-Kon v. Han'guk Hwamul Chadongch'a Chusik Hoesa, 65 Ta 1156 (Sup. Ct. Aug.
31, 1965).
[1051 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
[106] See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
[1071 Commercial Code, art. 403(1).
[1081 Id. art. 403(3). In the United States, both courts and commentators are in sharp
disagreement as to whether or not disinterested directors or an "independent" litigation committee should be able to bar a shareholder derivative action on the grounds that the action is not in
the best interest of the corporation. See ALI Draft No. 1, supra note 2, at 295-350. No Korean
case addresses this issue. See Takeuchi, Kabunushi no daiyo soho (Shareholders Derivative
Actions), in 3 Hogaku Kyokai Huakushunen Kinen Romnbunshu (Essays in Celebration of the 100th
Anniversary of the Founding of the Jurisprudence Association) 191-94 (1983) for a view that
favors shareholder derivative suits without board intervention.
[109] Commercial Code, art. 402.
[110] This situation contrasts with that which exists in the United States; U.S. shareholders
commonly file derivative suits. See Kim, The Protection of Minority Shareholdersin Korean Public
Corporations: A Comparative Study with American Corporation Law, 9 Korean J. Comp. L. 33,
45-50 (1981).
[111] Commercial Code, arts. 402, 403(1).
[112] Kim, supra note 109, at 47.
[113] See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30 (1982).
[114] Y. Shin, supra note 15, at 362-67.
[115] Id. at 854.
[116] Commercial Code, art. 405. For a discussion of U.S. law, see H. Henn & J. Alexander,
supra note 10, at 1107-14 (1983).
[117] Commercial Code, art. 405.
[118] S. Song, supra note 15, at 854.
[119] Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw: An Essayfor Bill Cary. 37 U. Miami L.
Rev. 187, 203-04 (1983). Free market theorists argue that these three market mechanisms spur
management to perform honestly and efficiently for fear of business failure, high financing cost,
and takeover, respectively. Id.
[120] See L. Jones & 1. Sakong, supra note 6, at 171-75.
[121] See D. Cole & Y. Park, supra note 29, at 284.
[122] Securities and Exchange Law, art. 200(1). In calculating the percentage of shareholding,
the shares held under the name of certain relatives or other related persons are treated as the
shares of the shareholder involved.
[123] Id. art. 200(3).
[124] Id. art. 200(2).
[125] See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
[126] Securities and Exchange Law, art. 200.
[127] Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d).
[128] See Y. Shin, supra note 15, at 288.
[129] Securities and Exchange Law, art. 25; Enforcement Decree for the Securities and
Exchange Law, Law No. 818 of 1962, art. 13.
[130] Enforcement Decree for the Securities and Exchange Law, art. 130.
[131] Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4). and Rule 14d-9, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-9 (1985) require Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1985) to be filed under similar
circumstances.
[132] If the target company chooses not to make any recommendation, then it need not
disclose any material information regarding the tender offer unless the Securities Administration
Committee so orders. Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27.
[133] D. Cole & Y. Park, supra note 29, at 284.
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